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THE CASE OF BENJAMIN KITT 
[By I. D. McN AUGHT AN, B.A., Lecturer, History 
Department, University of Queensland.] 
(Read at the Monthly General Meeting of the His-
torical Society of Queensland, Inc., on 28th June 1951.) 
The Kitt Case has been remembered outside 
Queensland only because of the constitutional ques-
tions which arose out of it. Most studies have lifted 
it almost completely from its political background so 
that the whole thing has been misunderstood or used 
to make quite false deductions. This paper attempts 
to replace the affair in its context. To do this it is as 
well to begin with a summary of the main features 
of the political crisis, before going on to a reinterpre-
tation. 
The dispute about a certain Benjamin Kitt arose 
immediately after the Queensland general election of 
May 1888. By this election. Sir Samuel Griffith's 
"Liberal Party," which had held power since November 
1883, was turned out and the "National Party" under 
Sir Thomas Mcllwraith took office on 13th June. The 
defeated Liberal Party drew most of its votes from the 
towns. Very approximately, it represented the majority 
of professional men, artisans, tradesmen and small 
farmers. The National Party can best be described 
as "the rest." On the squatter-planter-merchant base 
was a superstructure contrived of Irish interests, pro-
tectionists, publicans, and even one or two republicans. 
It is difficult to say in what their nationalism consisted, 
except perhaps in the case of the Irish. For most it 
does not seem to have gone much deeper than hap-
hazard opposition to certain arrangements made by 
Griffith with Downing Street during the Colonial Con-
ference at London in 1887. The party was national 
only in the rather strained sense that it collected 
almost every interest opposed, for various reasons, to 
Griffith's policy. 
Meanwhile, on the 28th March, Kitt had been con-
victed at TownsvUle of stealing two pairs of boots 
This article is based on the files of Queensland Governors' correspondence which His 
ExcL'IIency, the Governor, has very kindly made available to the Department of 
History of the University of Queensland. References for Governors" correspon-
dence throughout are to titles of volumes in this series. 
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valued at 40/-. For that he was sentenced to three 
years' penal servitude. About a month after the Mc-
llwraith ministry took office, that is, on the 11th July, 
the Colonial Secretary recommended, through cabinet, 
that the Governor, Sir Anthony Musgrave, should re-
mit this sentence. The Governor, at the Executive 
CouncU meeting, declined to do so. The recommenda-
tion was resubmitted on the 18th July, and the Gov-
ernor again refused, stating that he saw no reason to 
doubt that the judge and jury were right, whUe for 
him to interfere would shake the confidence of the 
public in the administration of justice. He felt bound 
to exercise the Royal Prerogative of Mercy, which was 
legally confided to him, according to his own conviction, 
but if cabinet wished he would refer the question home 
for the Colonial Secretary's decision. 
Mcllwraith summed up cabinet's case in a long letter 
to the Governor dated 9th August 1888. He claimed 
that the Governor's refusal to accept the advice of his 
ministers in exercising the royal prerogative was "a 
grave departure from the principles of responsible 
government." For many years past this advice had 
always been followed, except in capital cases where 
the Governor was clearly told in his instructions to act 
on his own judgment. Mcllwraith quoted precedents 
in Canada and New South Wales and the opinions of 
such oracles in constitutional matters as Todd and 
Higinbotham, in an endeavour to show that the Gov-
ernor must always take the advice of his ministers. 
In view of these precedents cabinet would decline to 
accept the decision of the Secretary of State for 
Colonies. 
In his;reply of the 14th August, Musgrave denied 
that he was bound, either in law or by custom, to follow 
his ministers' advice and stated that he intended to 
place the whole question before the Secretary of State. 
A further exchange added little, and on the 3rd Sep-
tember the Premier waited on the Governor and said 
that his ministry had determined to resign unless the 
Governor accepted their advice on the matter by the 
following morning. Sir Anthony remained unmoved 
and on the 4th Mcllwraith sent in their resignation. 
That afternoon he laid the correspondence on the table 
of the Legislative Assembly, teUing the House that the 
decision of the Secretary of State was quite immaterial 
and would not influence the cabinet one way or another. 
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Meanwhile, that morning, the Governor had sent for 
Griffith and asked him to form a government. Griffith, 
after consideration, declined on the 5th; stating that 
he thought the Governor should take the advice of his 
ministers in cases such -as this, but at the same time 
could see no reason for their resignation while the 
matter was before the Secretary of State. On the same 
day Mcllwraith notified the Governor, who had refused 
to accept the resignation, that he and his colleagues 
would not proceed with parliamentary business until 
their successors were appointed, (i' 
The newspapers had been running the case for 
some time. "Figaro," the "Nationalist" newspaper, got 
hold of it as early as the 28th July and other papers 
were reporting it from the 11th August. By the 4th 
September the excitement throughout the colony was 
such that the Governor wrote that the state of affairs 
was "practically revolutionary." (2) i t is clear now that 
the most vocal opinion supported Mcllwraith. On the 
night of the 7th September a crowd estimated at seven 
to eight thousand marched in a torchlight procession 
to a point near the Houses of Parliament where a pub-
lic meeting was held and the action of the Governor 
condemned "unanimously." (3) Throughout Queensland 
there were similar meetings, and telegrams and letters 
poured into Brisbane, mostly supporting the ministry. 
The deadlock was ended by a cable from the Secretary 
of State on the 8th September ordering the release of 
Kitt. The cabinet thereupon withdrew its resigna-
tion, w 
It wUl be evident from this summary why studies 
which are based on the debates and correspondence 
printed in Hansard should treat the case purely at the 
constitutional (or personal) level. C. A. Bernays, for 
example, says: "Anyone famUiar with the political 
career of Sir Thomas Mcllwraith will readily under-
stand how his impatience of criticism and his dic-
tatorial inclinations would lead him to precipitate a 
crisis over a comparatively trifling matter." The issue, 
according to Bernays, was whether the Governor alone 
or the Governor-in-Council should exercise the prero-
gative "and it was just over that one fine point that 
(1) For correspondence, see "Q.P. Debates," Vol. LV; pp. 186-194, 196. Also 
"V. & P. of L.A. of Q.," 1888, Vol. I; pp. 679fr., 691ff. 
(2) Telegram to Secretary of State for Colonies. See his desp. No. 78. 4/9/88: 
"Qovernor's Despatches to the Secretary of State," Vol. VII. ' 
(3) Sec "Evening Observer," 7/9/88. 
(4) See "Q.P. Debates." Vol LV; p. 206 ff. , 
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two obstinate men came in conflict." (5) But such an 
explanation only raises the wider question why such 
collisions with the Home Government or its agents 
should have occurred over functions which were pre-
viously accepted without dispute. If the question is 
pressed the usual answer will be that the growth of 
Australian national sentiment made these clashes in-
evitable. 
But it is doubtful whether this dawning sentiment 
of "adulthood" producing, as it undoubtedly did, a fit-
ful desire for complete self-government or an irritation 
with Imperial supervision, was ever more than a fav-
ourable medium in which interested groups in the 
colonies struggled for, and usually gained, immediate 
and ulterior objectives. The sentiment of "adulthood" 
may explain widespread support for the colonial gov-
ernment concerned, but scarcely the motives of the 
government itself. It may always be a necessary con-
dition but is rarely, if ever, a cause. The milestones 
on the road to self-government have too often been 
sentimentalised into monuments to Australian patriots, 
commemorating the victories of their long struggle 
with British Imperial domination. They might be 
described just as realistically as the tombstones under 
which are buried a number of enlightened but lost 
causes. In fact neither figure helps us much. The 
point is that, in almost all cases, these crises occurred 
only when a legitimate and accepted function of the 
Colonial Office or its representative became entangled 
in a local party political conflict. 
So it is in the Kitt case. Indeed this affair is 
typical of many others. Thus, in the previous decade 
of the 'seventies, historians are confronted with the 
curious spectacle of the Gardiner case in New South 
Wales.'*) On this occasion Henry Parkes, one of the 
fathers of the nation, is discovered "preferring" that 
the reluctant Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson, should 
exercise the prerogative of mercy without consulting 
his ministers at aU. "A larger share by the minister 
in the exercise of the prerogative of pardon, would 
not," he said, "in my judgment, be more satisfactory 
to the public." (^> His reason seems to have been that 
(5) "Queens land Pol i t ics During Sixty Y e a r s " ; (Br i sbane , n .d . ) ; p p . 116-7 Cf. 
also A. C. V. M e l b o u r n e : ar t ic les in "Da i ly M a i l , " 1927. 
(S) See Pa rkes . Sir H e n r y : "F i f ty Yi-ars in the Making of Austra l ian H i s t o r v " -
(London, 1892) ; p . 281 ff. ' ' 
(7) " I b i d . . " p . 286. 
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he wished to sidestep what he called "an unscrupulous 
party movement." It was Sir Hercules who insisted 
that the Governor must have Ministerial advice on 
applications for pardon.'**> The instructions to Gov-
ernors were altered accordingly. 
Or taking an illustration nearer home, Griffith is 
found, in 1886, insisting that the Governor must grant 
leave of absence to Legislative Councillors only on the 
advice of his ministers. His opponent, who struggled 
to uphold the Crown's prerogative, was a Queenslander 
and a henchman of Mcllwraith—the temporary admin-
istrator of the Government, Sir Arthur Palmer. Palmer 
had been Colonial Secretary in the first Mcllwraith 
administration and was Lady Mcllwraith's brother-in-
law.*" Again, Mcllwraith's party in 1887-8 had op-
posed and defeated the Liberal government's Naval 
Defence Bill in the name of independence and nation-
hood. The Bill provided for an Australian squadron of 
the Royal Navy partly maintained by colonial tax-
payers in accordance with the agreement made by 
Griffith and other colonial representatives with the 
British Government at the Colonial Conference in Lon-
don. Griffith was called an "Imperialist" and his bill 
the "Naval Tribute Bill" when the National party had 
an election to win. When it became expedient for them 
to form a coalition government with Griffith most of 
them swallowed his bill, entire and unadulterated, with-
out visible difficulty. <'°^  
Usually it is abundantly clear that the precipating 
factor is an internal colonial issue. It will be argued 
here that although the Kitt incident became important 
as one of the test cases defining the relations between 
the Crown and Colonial administrations, the question 
of self-government or "responsible government" is 
only a part of the story. It is a consequence rather 
than a cause. The Kitt case can best be explained as 
one more skirmish in the desultory war over Kanaka 
labour. To make good this interpretation it will be 
necessary to look at the available evidence on the 
motives of both sides: i.e., of the Governor and of the 
Mcllwraith ministry. 
It is relatively easy to judge why Sir Anthony 
Musgrave acted as he did. The Governor was an in-
(8) "Ibid.," p. 290. 
(9) See, e.g.. Palmer to Chief Secretary, 22/9/86: "Governor's Orticial Letters to 
Various Persons," Vol. II. 
(10) Sn "Q.P. Debates," Vol. LXIV; 7/7/91. 
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telligent and spirited man, near the end of a long 
public life and in the habit of speaking his mind. The 
key to his motives is to be found in a code telegram*"* 
and a confidential despatch, f^ )^ both to the Secretary of 
State, dated the 4th September. In the former Mus-
grave states: "It [the recommendation for Kitt's re-
lease] is intended to clear the way for pardon of 
prisoners referred to in my confidential despatch of 
29th December 1884." (These prisoners were six of 
the crew of the labour vessel "Hopeful" convicted in 
1884 of the murder and kidnapping of New Guinea 
natives.) The confidential despatch of the 4th Septem-
ber reads, in part: 
"It is right to state what is tolerably well under-
stood here that the case of Benjamin Kitt is put 
forward merely as a convenient test case for the 
purpose of establishing the principle that no mat-
ter how groundless the recommendation may be, 
any recommendation for pardon or mitigation of 
sentence made by the ministry is to have effect 
given to it without question by the Governor. The 
intention is to nullify all pretence at 'the retention 
of the personal decision of the Governor.' The 
real object in view is to pardon the convicts in the 
notorious 'Hopeful' case in respect of which agita-
tion has recently been stirred up by the parties 
who were useful supporters of the present Govern-
ment during the late general election." 
Finally he wrote after the release of the prisoners: 
". . . . I should never have regarded the case 
of Benjamin Kitt as of great importance, an(l 
might have given way to their recommendations 
after my first remonstrance, if I had not been con-
vinced that the pertinacity with which it was 
pressed was intended to establish the principle 
that the Governor . . . . is to be a mere hand to 
register the decrees of his 'advisers'." (^ 3) 
Taken together these statements can only mean 
that the Governor refused to release Kitt, because he 
thought that cabinet intended later to recommend the 
release of the "Hopeful" prisoners and that cabinet 
wished first to establish the principle that these recom-
mendations for release of prisoners must always be 
(11) "Governor"? Despatches to Secretary of State," Vol. VII. 
(12) .Tn "Governor's Confidential Despatches to the Secretary of State." Vol I 
(13) To Secretary of State. No. 83. 11/9/88: "Governor's Despatches to Secretary 
of State "' Vol. VII. 
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accepted. Musgrave would clearly have been more 
accurate if he had said that he thought cabinet wishecJ 
to prevent him establishing the contrary principle: 
that such recommendations may always be rejected. 
It was after all usual to accept the advice of cabinet: 
to do so in this case could hardly constitute an impor-
tant precedent. To reject it in this case most certainly 
would, so that strictly the initiative at first lay with 
the Governor. With that modification the quotations 
probably state accurately one, if not all, of the Gov-
ernor's motives. 
If this is so, two questions at once arise: Why 
should Musgrave be prepared to go to such lengths to 
establish his right to refuse to release the "Hopeful" 
prisoners? Secondly, why should he not wait for the 
real issue to arise—the actual recommendation for the 
release of the "Hopeful" prisoners—before making a 
stand ? 
The first question is not hard to answer. The 
"Hopeful" case had been in Sir Anthony's own words 
"a very bad one."^ ^** The Chief Justice, who tried the 
six men late in 1884, stated that "the evil deeds of the 
prisoners had involved unauthorised warfare, murder 
and all the characteristics of piracy and slave-hunt-
ing." ds) Griffith's government, which was of course 
hostile to the Kanaka trade, immediately appointed a 
Royal Commission to investigate the "Hopeful" and five 
other ships which had been recruiting in New Guinea 
waters. In its report of April 1885 no ship was given 
a clean bill. The mildest finding was that the natives 
on one did not understand their contract (to "work in 
sugar" in Queensland for three years). In all other 
cases the Ck)mmission found that the natives had been 
kidnapped or fraudulently recruited. "The history of 
the cruise of the 'Hopeful'," the Commission reported, 
"is one long record of deceit, cruel treachery, deliberate 
kidnapping and cold-blooded murder." <"*' Mainly on the 
strength of the "Hopeful" trial and of this report, the 
Liberal Government brought down an act in September 
prohibiting the introduction of Kanakas after the 31st 
December 1890. ('^ ^ Afterwards it became pretty clear 
that the Crown case at the trial rested mainly on the 
(14) To Erskine, 6/10/84: "Governor's OtHcial Letters to Various Persons," Vol. II. 
(15) Quoted Musgrave to Secretary of State, Conf., 4/9/88: "Governors Confiden-
tial Despatches to Secretary of Slate," Vol. I. 
n6) Printed in "V. & P. of L.A. of Q.," 1885, Vol. I I ; p. 797 et seq. 
(17) "The Pacific Island Labour Act of 1880 Amendment Act," 49* Vic . No. 17. 
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testimony of a brace of rogues. As to the Royal Com-
mission, evidence soon began to build up suggesting 
that some of the natives had not been deceived by the 
recruiters, but had themselves deceived the commis-
sioners. <'8' Every piece of evidence which threw doubt 
on the justice of the convictions, or on the commis-
sioners' findings, was, in the rough logic of politics, an 
argument against Griffith's Kanaka prohibition Act, 
based largely on that trial and those findings. By the 
time that Mcllwraith was in, the trial, the Commission 
and the Act were hopelessly identified. *"' A "retrial" 
of the case in the Executive Council, resulting in par-
don by the Governor, would be a retrospective vindica-
tion of the labour trade and a lever to overthrow the 
Kanaka prohibition Act. 
Now Musgrave was not merely convinced that 
these men were justly convicted, but was an inveterate 
enemy of the whole labour trade. One despatch gives 
a fair sample of his opinion. In March 1886 he de-
scribed Queensland to the Secretary of State as 
"a comparatively uneducated community which 
has shown itself notably regardless of the com-
monest rights of humanity in respect of the black 
native tribes within its own territory—to say 
nothing of what has been disclosed of the Kanaka 
labour trade. Nothing in the history of the slave 
trade or slavery in the West Indies is more shock-
ing than occurrences which have taken place in 
Queensland within the last ten or fifteen years. 
The display of popular feeling and sympathy with 
the criminals which I witnessed last year in the 
case of men most justly condemned to death for 
barbarous murders in what was nothing less than 
a slave hunting expedition on the coast of New 
Guinea is a thing not easily to be forgotten and it 
is far from creditable to the colony." (20) 
Clearly then the Governor was determined to re-
sist the release of the "Hopeful" prisoners not only on 
the merits of the case, but also because he feared that 
it would clear the way for the reopening of what he had 
(18) See. e.g., speech by P h i l p : " Q . P . D e b a t e s , " Vol . L I X ; 18/10/89, y„> 2295-6 
p i l i n g up this IHopefuM agna t ion are doin? the i r best l> r e i v e ' ibe M.,,.1, 
labour quest ion. . lai K 
(20) 11/3/86. Conf. : "Governor ' s Confidcn;ial Despatches lo S e n o l a r y of S t a t e " 
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always believed was "little better than a slave 
t r a d e . " <2i> 
The second question is more complicated. It is 
not easy at first to see why the Governor should not 
wait for the "Hopeful" case to arise before establishing 
his right to refuse his ministers' advice. Possibly he 
thought that if he chose his ground on an issue in 
which no local political question was obviously involved 
he would be upheld by the Secretary of State, since he 
clearly had the legal right to refuse assent. If so, a 
clear precedent would be established and the reprieve 
of these men would be impossible while he remained 
Governor. 
Musgrave obviously bargained without the noisy 
public support for Mcllwraith which was aroused when 
the Kitt case came out into the open. On the 4th Sep-
tember he told the Secretary of State: "I should have 
no doubt at all that the judgment of the Governor in 
these cases would be approved by the community at 
large if only his authority to decide is upheld by H.M. 
Government." (22) But in fact the Griffith party was 
caught in a cleft stick and maintained a painful sUence 
in the House during the debates of the next few days, 
while the Liberal newspapers were obviously embar-
rassed: opposed to the National party on one ground 
but reluctant to give open support to the Governor on 
the other under circumstances which would only pro-
vide fresh evidence of their "Imperialism." Because 
of the lack of local support the Secretary of State had 
no option by the 8th September but to instruct the 
Governor to withdraw. 
Perhaps Musgrave, then, simply miscalculated his 
chances of success; but this seems doubtful in view of 
his long and wide experience. Another explanation is 
arguable. It is probable that the Governor had not only 
the "Hopeful" case in mind but also the wider issue 
of the government of British New Guinea. When the 
Kitt case arose the annexation was imminent and final 
arrangements were being made for its administration. 
By June 1888 the general framework of the territory's 
government had been drafted. The Administrator of 
British New Guinea was to act under the instructions 
of the Governor of Queensland, who was to consult his 
(21) Musgrave to Erskine, 9/2/84: "(iovernor's Official Letters to Various Persons." 
Vol. II. 
(22) "Governor's Confidential Despatches to Secretary of State." \ ol. I. 
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Council in aU matters connected with it. This was the 
very arrangement that Musgrave had campaigned 
against for years. In the despatch of March 1886, 
already quoted, he claimed that any such arrangement 
would "practically place the Administrator . . . directly 
in subjection to the CouncU" of a colony where the 
moral tone of the mass of the people was so low that 
its politicians would wink at almost any abuse. The 
recruiters could use New Guinea to supply black labour 
and the British Government would be helpless to inter-
vene. "This," he said, "is what the sugar planters of 
Queensland and their capitalist supporters in Victoria 
have been struggling for all along, from the time of 
Sir Thomas Mcllwraith's first action in the matter." 
In October 1887 he again protested against what 
he called the "evident intention" of the British Govern-
ment to hand over substantial control to the Queens-
land Government, and asked for a careful definition of 
his authority vis-a-vis the Council, since he anticipated 
the return to power shortly of the Mcllwraith party. 
This party included, he said, those anxious to use New 
Guinea as "a preserve to furnish black labour for the 
Queensland sugar plantations" and "those who persis-
tently closed their eyes to the revolting cruelties of the 
Queensland labour traffic." (23) j ^ confidential de-
spatches of 10th September 1887 and 30th March and 
22nd June 1888(2*) ^e stated that he had not been re-
assured on these matters and would refuse to take up 
his duties unless his status and authority were clearly 
defined. The last of these despatches, it should be 
noted, is dated just a little less than three weeks before 
the Kitt case began. 
As if to confirm his fears the black labour question 
was reopened just at the time of the first recommen-
dation for the release of Kitt. On the 9th July, two 
days before the recommendation was made, the "Tele-
graph" in a leader gave prominence to a rumour that 
the Mcllwraith Government was going to repeal the 
Kanaka prohibition Act. The fact that Hume Black, 
the representative of the northern planters and an 
avowed champion of black labour, was in his cabinet 
was a fair indication, the "Telegraph" thought, that 
the rumour would become fact. The next day the 
"Observer," which supported Mcllwraith, reviewed the 
(23) To Secretary of Stale, 20/10/87, Conf.- "Ibid." 
(24) "Ibid." 
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history of the New Guinea Protectorate and came to 
the conclusion that it had been a "miserable fiasco." 
Burns, PhUp & Co. had lost heavily there and so had 
many another planter and trader. Queensland ought 
to make sure that she got a profit out of the territory 
in return for the £15,000 bUl for the cost of administra-
tion. Again on the 13th July, two days after the first 
recommendation for the release of Kitt, Mr. Swallow, 
head of the firm of Swallow and Ariell, Melbourne bis-
cuit manufacturers, and one of the firm of Swallow and 
Derham, sugar planters of Cairns, published a scheme 
in the "Courier" for recruiting in New Guinea. This, 
Mr. SwaUow said, was becoming imperative since the 
Chinese were to be excluded soon and Griffith's Act 
prohibiting the recruiting of Islanders would come into 
force at the end of 1890. New Guinea recruiting could 
be supervised by the administrator and the Queensland 
Government and therefore would be free of abuse. 
Now, whatever the precise legal position, and it 
was an extraordinarily tangled one, there can be no 
question that the Queenslanders assumed that their 
elected representatives were to control New Guinea 
through their Executive Council. '25) The Governor, who 
had been kept in almost complete ignorance of the 
negotiations, had drawn the attention of the Colonial 
Office to this assumption many times in the past 
year,<26) but as far as he was aware the position had 
not been clarified by late June 1888. He was afraid, 
whatever the Colonial Office protested to the contrary, 
that the draft Letters Patent, Commission and Royal 
Instructions erecting the actual machinery of adminis-
tration and soon to come into force, would in fact con-
firm that assumption—that New Guinea was to be 
largely in the hands of the Governor-in-Council. If 
this meant that the Queensland cabinet could over-
ride the Governor, the situation in Musgrave's view 
would not only be deplorable politically, but, for tech-
nical reasons which do not concern us here, would be 
actually illegal. 
He could not fail then, to see the dispute about 
Kitt, which arose early in the following month, in the 
light of the New Guinea situation. There was little 
perceptible difference between his status in exercising 
(25) See, e.g., "Courier," 9/9/87, Leader. Hume Black: "Q.P. Debates," Vol. LIII. 
1887: pp. 1114-5. 
(25) Particularly in his despatch to Secretary of State, 10/9/87, Conf. : "Governor'a 
Confidential Despatches to Secretary of Stale." Vol. I. 
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the Prerogative of Pardon and his status in exercising 
control over the Administrator of New Guinea. In 
both cases his instructions directed him to consult with 
the Executive CouncU. If he bowed to the doctrine 
that "consult" must always mean "accept the advice 
of" then he would in fact give the cabinet of Queens-
land predominant power over New Guinea. The Gov-
ernor would be the Imperial rubber stamp approving 
the acts of the Queensland ministry. 
This seems to be the force of his confidential de-
spatch of 18th August 1888, <27) in which he again 
attacks these "proceedings which undoubtedly have 
the effect of placing the possession under the control 
of the Government of Queensland." A postscript to 
that despatch reads: "The present temper of local 
government upon the subject of the Royal Prerogative 
of Pardon—in respect of which they dispute the right 
of the Queen's representative to any independent judg-
ment and virtually declare the severance of the Colony 
from all control of any kind on the part of the Crown 
or Government of Great Britain, renders it the more 
necessary that the Governor of Queensland, who is 
directed to consult the ministry of Queensland in all 
things with regard to New Guinea should understand 
distinctly what is his legal authority and status with 
regard to that possession." When later, in a despatch 
already quoted, <28) he says that he might have given 
way on the Kitt case, after a first remonstrance, had 
he not been convinced that the case was pressed to 
establish the principle "that the Governor is not sup-
posed to be entitled to an opinion in the administra-
tion of the Government over which he presides. . . . ," 
it is more than feasible that he had in mind not only 
the Government of Queensland but also the Govern-
ment of New Guinea. Whether or not the "Hopeful" 
case could wait, the New Guinea "instruments" would 
shortly go into force and the matter was urgent. His 
position then was this. If he won the Kitt case he 
would loosen the hold of the Queensland ministry over 
the territory, and would probably be in a position to 
frustrate any attempts to recruit labour there. If he. 
lost, at least he would have demonstrated, with a force 
that his most heated arguments could never carry, the 
(27) "Ibid." 
(28) To Secretary of Stale, 11/9/88, No. 83: "Governor's Desnatrhes lo S,', rotary of 
Stale," Vol VII. 
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utter powerlessness of the Governor to curb the local 
ministry in its dealings with New Guinea under the 
proposed arrangement. (29) 
It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the 
Governor refused to release Kitt because he wished to 
prevent the release of the "Hopeful" convicts, with all 
that the release would imply. Further, it is likely that 
he refused to release Kitt also because he feared that 
New Guinea would pass under the direct control of 
the Queensland cabinet and hoped to prevent this. 
If the Governor acted for the reasons suggested, 
it is still possible, of course, that Mcllwraith and his 
coUeagues were mainly concerned with the "constitu-
tional" issue: that is, they may have wanted to pre-
vent an autocratic Governor from overstepping what 
they thought were accepted canons of "responsible" 
government. In turning to estimate the motives of 
Mcllwraith's cabinet, however, we are faced with an 
obvious difficulty in the lack of direct evidence. If 
members of the cabinet left any confidential records 
or correspondence on the subject these have not been 
found. The most that can be done is to assemble the 
"circumstantial" evidence which might answer the two 
obvious questions: Was Mcllwraith's government at 
the time of the Kitt case, committed to release the 
"Hopeful" prisoners ? If so, was this their main reason 
for insisting on the release of Kitt ? (3°> 
To explain the National party's policy towards the 
"Hopeful" prisoners it is necessary to go back to the 
party's tactics in the election of 1888. After the re-
distribution of seats under the Electoral Districts Act 
of 1887, it is useful to divide Queensland into two 
groups of electorates on a line running roughly from 
Maryborough to Goondiwindi. In the huge area North 
and West of the line there were now thirty-eight seats 
(counting Burrum). Grazing and sugar, with their 
sateUite interests, would win most of these for the 
Mcllwraith party, but certainly not all. In the event, 
the Liberals held only five seats—Burke, which took 
in the Croydon and Woolgar goldfields (two seats), the 
mining electorate of Charters Towers (two seats) and 
(29) Sec also Musgrave to Secretary of State, 15/10/88, Secret: "Governor's Con-
fidential Despatches to Secretary of State," Vol. I, in which he attempted to 
drive home the lesson. 
(30) The question whether Mcllwraith also had an eye on the -New Guinea adminis-
tration is left aside. What little evidence there is suggests that both politi.:al 
parties simply assumed that the Queensland Government (i.e., cabinet) would 
control the territory. 
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Cairns (one seat). This was better than Mcllwraith 
could reasonably have expected. In the corner south-
east of the line there were thirty-four seats (counting 
Maryborough), twelve of them in Brisbane. Most of 
this area hacJ been solidly Liberal in 1883 and Mc-
llwraith would need some seats here to give him a clear 
win. He himself stood for North Brisbane opposite 
Griffith. To gain any substantial vote in the area his 
party was compeUed to somersault and promise cate-
gorically not to reintroduce black labour and to exclude 
the Chinese, whatever his planter or squatter sup-
porters thought of the matter. As it turned out he 
collected a fine bag; twelve seats in the area, five of 
them in metropolitan electorates, and one of them in 
the Liberal stronghold of Fortitude Valley. Griffith 
later said that Mcllwraith had engineered this landslide 
by the simple device of taking over the Liberal policy, 
particularly on coloured labour. 
As one might expect, then, the attitude of the 
"Nationalist" candidates towards the "Hopeful" case 
during the election campaign was fairly cautious, at 
any rate at first. Mcllwraith began by stating in his 
published manifesto to the electors of North Bris-
bane (^ i> that the New Guinea scandal in which the 
"Hopeful" had been prominent was the fault of the 
Griffith government which had licensed the vessels to 
recruit there. His own government had never allowed 
labour ships to go to New Guinea. In his first address to 
his constituents on 16th March he said: "The atrocities 
brought to light when these vessels came in shocked 
the whole civilized world." He went on to say with 
more force than elegance that ". . . . the account given 
by the Royal Commission was something horrifying." 
Again the argument was that the Liberal government 
had been responsible. (=*2) But by 12th AprU he admitted 
in answer to a question that he ". . . would favour fur-
ther inquiry into the 'Hopeful' case, if more evidence 
were forthcoming." (^ s) Qn the 26th his attitude is 
clearer: "With regard to liberating the 'Hopeful' 
prisoners the matter should be carefully deliberated, 
and all the information that could be got should be 
obtained. There was a great deal worthy of investiga-
tion and it would have his instant attention as soon as 
(31) "Courier," 14/3/88. ~ 
(32) "Ibid.," 13/4/88. 
(33^ "Ibid.," 13/4/88. 
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he got into office." (^ 4) The "Telegraph," no doubt 
assuming that it would be unpopular, emphasised this 
answer in a column caUed "Election Points": "Do you 
know?—That Sir Thomas wUl attend to the 'Hopeful' 
case 'as soon as I get into office'." Evidently Mcllwraith 
was uncertain of the city's temper on the subject and 
was feeling his way. 
The supporters of Sir Thomas were less guarded. 
Mr. T. Logan addressed the electors of Toowong on the 
7th May. "He considered the present punishment very 
inhuman, unnatural and un-Christianlike. He thought 
that the 'Hopeful' prisoners had suffered long enough 
and it was time mercy was extended to them. He sup-
posed the Premier read his Bible, yet he stiffened his 
neck and hardened his heart and allowed those people 
to waste their life in prison, almost in irons. . ."'^ ^^  
(Mr. Logan was not returned.) Mr. Cooper, speaking 
the following day at Red Hill said: 
"With reference to the 'Hopeful' prisoners he 
considered that' it was no tragedy at all for which 
they were condemned, seeing that the kanakas 
were in the habit of trying to murder the white 
crews. In this case the white men were convicteti 
and the white man had no means of redress at 
aU. . ."(«) 
Mr. Cooper expressed himself simUarly on other oc-
casions. Mr. Burton at Fortitude Valley f^ '^ and Mr. 
Swanwick at WooUoongabba f'^ ) also advocated release. 
None of these outspoken gentlemen were returned, 
but it was clear that they were expressing the opinion 
at least of an influential section of the National party, 
if not of the Brisbane electors. The impression seems 
to have been widespread that the party as a whole 
stood for release. The editor of "Figaro," an ardent 
supporter of Mcllwraith, wrote on the 21st July: "I 
have every confidence that Premier Mcllwraith and his 
government will satisfy to the full the promises they 
made respecting these shameful convictions and they 
are as fully pledged to do that which is right and just 
for the 'Hopeful' martyrs as is 'Figaro'." f^'* In the 
following year, a Mr. Hunter got up in the House and 
reported him less fully and with a (.34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
"Telegraph," 27/4/88. The "Courier' 
different emphasis on this point. 
"Telegraph," 8/5/88. 
"Ibid.," 9/5/88. 
"Ibid.," 10/5/.S8. 
"Ibid.," 12/5/88. 
Sub-leader. 
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said: " . . . the present Government party when they 
came before the country two years ago pledged them-
selves if they were returned to release the 'Hopeful' 
prisoners." (*"> The statement was not denied. What-
ever the members of the party had or had not specific-
ally said, they undoubtedly gave the impression that 
they favoured release. 
Further they must have intended to give that im-
pression. On polling day in North Brisbane, Mcllwraith 
aUowed the balcony of his committee room to be 
adorned with a large placard depicting the prisoners 
fettered and behind bars, appealing in vain to Griffith 
for release. Again, during the election campaign a 
pamphlet on the case called "Facts to Know" was cir-
culated in Brisbane. Some of the accusations against 
Griffith read: 
"That the trial of McNeU [sic] and WiUiams 
was conducted in a manner utterly at variance 
with fair play, justice and humanity. That the 
evidence of cannibals, tutored for the purpose of 
criminating the prisoners, was utterly worthless, 
and should never have been admitted in a question 
involving the life of a white man . . . . That these 
facts were so well understood by the people of 
Brisbane that they determined to hold a monster 
meeting to protest against the vindictive and 
harsh measures adopted by the Premier witli re-
gard to the 'Hopeful' prisoners." (*i' 
If these "facts" were correct there could, of course, be 
no question about the necessity for immediate release. 
Now the significant thing is this. Griffith quoted the 
tract in full in the House on the 15th August, and in 
reply Mcllwraith said: "I am not responsible for it. I 
read it now in print for the first time, but I am pre-
pared to justify the 'facts'—every one of them that the 
hon. gentleman has called abominable falsehoods. . . . 
I take up the position of justifying everything the hon. 
gentleman has referred to."(*2) 
Indeed Mcllwraith would have found it hard to 
adopt any other attitude. About eighteen of his party 
in the House, including three out of eight ministers, 
can be said to have represented the planter interest. 
One of these was Robert PhUp (of Burns Philp), who 
(40) "Q.P. Debates," Vol. LIX, 1889; p. 2299. 
(41) See "Ibid.," Vol. LV, 1888; p. 20. 
(42) "Ibid.": p. 25. 
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had been part owner of the "Hopeful" in 1883. 
Another, A, S. Cowley, had been manager of "Ham-
leigh" plantation near Ingham, employing natives from 
the "Lizzie," one of the six ships investigated by the 
Royal Commission of 1885. The report of the Com-
mission had made it appear that Cowley had "coached" 
and intimidated the boys to give false evidence before 
the Commissioners at "Hamleigh." <«) But even apart 
from the sugar interests, many of the squatters and 
merchants in his party obviously favoured release. 
In view of all this, it seems clear that at the time 
of the Kitt case the "National" administration was 
tacitly committed to the release of the "Hopeful" men. 
To give a definite answer to the second question 
on the cabinet's motives, i.e., to decide whether cabinet 
insisted on the release of Kitt mainly to ensure the 
release of the "Hopeful" men, is not possible. The 
difficult word is "mainly.' 
Obviously it could be argued that the first recom-
mendation for Kitt's release was made on the merits 
of the case. There had been protests against the 
severity of the sentence at the time, and the question 
had come before the Colonial Secretary in Griffith's 
government, just before it went out of office. He had 
made enquiries about the man's previous character, 
and had been informed that nothing was known against 
Kitt by the local police before his conviction. The 
new administration considered this testimony impor-
tant. Although the judge gave the opinion that Kitt 
had been guilty of numerous thefts on other occasions, 
Mcllwraith claimed that no evidence supporting this 
conclusion appeared in the judge's notes. (**' In view 
of this there was undoubtedly a strong case for recom-
mending release on the ground that the sentence was 
too severe. Certainly the Governor had not scrupled 
in the past to release prisoners either against the 
opinion of the judge or, more often, without getting the 
judge's opinion at all. (*^ ) 
Cabinet could argue, then, that the judge had been 
too severe, if not prejudiced. This could reasonably 
(43) The manager of the C.S.R.'s "Victoria" plantation (also near Ingham), where 
most of the recruits from the "Hopeful" were employed, was E. Cowley. I 
have not been able to discover whether he was a relation. 
(44) See "Q.P. Debates," Vol. LV, 1888; p. 188. 
(45) Mcllwraith stated that during Musgrave's administration the Governor had re-
mitted 169 sentences. Of these 111 were tried in the Supreme or District Courts. 
Of these the judge's report was obtained in only 56 cases. Of these .S6 were 
remitted or pardoned against the opinion of the judge; "Ibid."; p. 189. 
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explain their insistence up to a point, but hardly their 
resignation without hearing the Secretary of State's 
decision. They would scarcely be prepared to bring the 
government of the colony to a standstill simply to free 
Kitt, when the Secretary of State might order his re-
lease in a few days. Mcllwraith himself argued 
throughout that the question of the release of Kitt was 
not in itself important. "Hon. members," he told the 
House, "must not be under the delusion that this is a 
mere quarrel about the remission of a sentence or the 
pardoning of a prisoner." <*'^  
It is still plausible, however, that cabinet, having 
opened the case on its merits, would carry insistence 
to the limit simply on constitutional grounds. This in 
effect was Mcllwraith's explanation. Moreover, the 
platform of the "Australian National Party" which 
was adopted just after Mcllwraith took office, appears 
to support this argument. The motto of the party was 
to be "Alliance, not Dependence." The first objects of 
the party were— 
" 1 . The cultivation of an Australian national spirit. 
2. The Federation of the Australian colonies into 
a United Dominion with provision for a system 
of Australian national defence. 
3. The energetic vindication and protection of the 
civil and political liberties, rights and obliga-
tions of the people, and the adoption of the 
principle that laws passed by the Australian 
Legislature shall not require Imperial sanction 
to render them operative." <*') 
On the surface the conduct of Mcllwraith's ministry 
would seem to fiow naturally from this source. Their 
action on the Kitt case could be considered an obvious 
extension of object number three. 
But a closer scrutiny brings out certain angular 
features which do not fit happUy into this picture of a 
Nationalist Party vindicating or protecting colonial 
legislative autonomy. On the 10th August, when the 
Kitt case was already fairly well advanced, Mcllwraith 
stated the opinion of his ministry on certain proposed 
amendments to the Letters Patent and Royal Instruc-
tions to the Governors of self-governing colonies. These 
amended regulations had been circulated in draft form 
for the criticism of the governments concerned before 
(46) "Ibid."; p. 194. 
(47) Primed "Evening Observer." 20/6/88. 
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being issued. The amended "instruments" stUl left the 
Governor the clear legal right to reject his ministers' 
advice in cases such as Kitt's. The ministers, Mc-
llwraith wrote, 
"are not prepared to suggest any alterations of the 
drafts provided that it be understood that the pro-
visions of these Instruments shall not be so con-
strued as to interfere with the conditions of re-
sponsible government which I take to be that the 
Governor shall consult with the Executive Council 
in all matters appertaining to the government of 
the Colony, and shall in all things follow their 
advice, except when it may appear to him in any 
case that Imperial interests or the interests of any 
other of Her Majesty's colonies would be materi-
aUy prejudiced thereby." (*^ ' 
The puzzle is that they declined, in the middle of 
the Kitt case, to ask for an amendment which would 
lay down in black and white the principle they claimed 
to be defending. Mcllwraith had told Musgrave the 
day before that the Governor's refusal to accept his 
Council's advice was "a grave departure from the prin-
ciples of responsible government." Why did he not 
take this opportunity to request a legal barrier pre-
venting such departures in the future? It can hardly 
be urged that this is simply an example of the tradi-
tional British reluctance to have political powers and 
functions too closely defined. The definition which 
Mcllwraith pressed for in the memorandum was close 
and rigid enough in all conscience: it would mean the 
total prevention of any independent action by the Gov-
ernor in internal colonial matters. And if the Governor 
should be rigidly bound by an understanding, why not 
by specific instructions ? The answer seems to be that 
cabinet had no wish to prohibit such departures in the 
future, but only whUe the National party held power. 
Mcllwraith made his attitude plainer in the House. 
For example, on the 11th September he explained to 
the (no doubt slightly confused) members: 
'T have never quarrelled with the position the 
Governor takes up—that he has full power to do 
what he likes in the way of rejecting any advice. 
I never quarrelled about that. In fact I wrote a 
letter about a month ago to His Excellency, saying 
(48) To Musgrave, 10/8/88: "Local Official Letters to the Governor," Vol. LVI.\. 
Black letters mine. 
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that I thought he ought to have that power, be-
cause we do not know when an extravagant Minis-
ter might give some extravagant advice that it 
would be the Governor's duty to reject. But if he 
rejects advice he must take the consequences. He 
ought to have the power, and I have never dis-
puted that; but what I do quarrel with is that His 
ExceUency should exercise that power himself and 
still retain his Ministry. He has no right to the 
advice of Ministers whose advice he rejects."**" 
It is no doubt true that a pedantic logical consistency, 
which Emerson is said to have deplored, is rarely a 
weakness of politicians. Yet it is hard to find the wider 
harmony in these statements. Indeed, when the smoke 
of contradiction clears, it is seen that the purely "con-
stitutional" explanation for cabinet's course of action 
is in shreds. The case was not fought after all, it 
seems, to establish that the Governor must always 
accept the advice of his ministers. On the contrary, 
Mcllwraith specifically said, at last, that he did not 
want that principle adopted. In any case he had re-
jected in advance the decision of the Colonial Office, the 
only authority which could alter the Governor's in-
structions. Again, he and his colleagues could hardly 
have been asserting that the cabinet must resign if the 
Governor did not accept his ministers' advice. 
Obviously cabinet was always free to resign and would 
do so if it thought the matter sufficiently important, 
and in any case, Mcllwraith could hardly have intended 
to dictate the tactics of future cabinets. Finally, to 
establish the rule that the Governor, if he did not wish 
to take his ministers' advice, must dismiss them and 
get others whose advice he was prepared to take, would 
be pointless. The ministers themselves could, if they 
wished, produce precisely the same result by resigning. 
It is thus hard to see that the Mcllwraith cabinet 
wished to lay down, protect or vindicate any constitu-
tional principle, in the sense of either a conventional or 
written rule limiting or defining future practice. Their 
action boils down to a simple assertion of the National 
party's power and intention to compel the Governor to 
follow their cabinet's advice on questions of pardon; 
or, in plainer terms, to force Musgrave to release what-
ever prisoners they wished. With fifty-four seats in a 
(•19) "Q.P. Debates," Vol. LV ; p. 209. 
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House of seventy-two they could do this easily without 
establishing a general rule which might prove incon-
venient if the party were, at some future time, in 
opposition when the ministers of the day chose to give 
the Governor "extravagant" advice. 
We are thus forced back, for want of any other 
feasible explanation, to consider the Governor's version 
of cabinet's motives. Here there is more evidence. It 
is not clear when cabinet began to consider the release 
of the "Hopeful" prisoners, but probably it was, as 
Mcllwraith had promised, as soon as he got into office. 
Governor Norman, in February 1890, said that the 
"Hopeful" case had been under consideration by the 
government "for the last twenty months," i.e. from 
June 1888. (5°> Whether this was so or not, it is cer-
tain that the agitation for their release was reopened 
just about the time when the Kitt case began. 
"Figaro" raised the matter on the 7th July 1888. 
The following issue on the 21st stated that numerous 
letters were reaching the editor "pleading the sad 
cause of the 'Hopeful' prisoners." A week later some-
one had given the editor full information on the dis-
pute over Kitt, which was reproduced in a leader con-
demning Musgrave. The sub-leader was in support of 
a petition to the Governor praying for the release of 
the "Hopeful" men. On the 27th a Committee was 
formed to direct the campaign in support of this peti-
tion. The committee, consisting entirely of National 
party supporters, held a series of meetings beginning 
on the 4th of August and running up to the time of 
Kitt's release. 
At the first meeting, a Mr. H. Loader said: 
"He thought that the Governor could not do 
otherwise than extend his clemency to the 
prisoners. . . . So far, however. Sir Anthony Mus-
grave had not shown much clemency of spirit, 
more particularly in regard to the man who, in the 
North, was sentenced to three years' imprison-
ment for stealing two pairs of boots; and if he 
were afraid to extend his clemency in the case of 
the 'Hopeful' prisoners, then the people of Queens-
land must look out for someone else who 
would." (51) 
(50) To Secretary cf Sl.lte, 22/2/90, Conf. : "Governor's Confidential Despatches to 
Secretary of State." Vol. I. 
(51) "Courier," 6/8/88. 
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The two issues, the Kitt case and the "Hopeful" 
petition developed together, and were reported and dis-
cussed side by side in the newspapers. The "Tele-
graph," as well as Mr. Loader and others, stated the 
obvious conclusion. "Speaking plainly," it said, "the 
way was to be prepared [by the Kitt case] for dealing 
with the 'Hopeful' prisoners." (^ 2) The connection 
seemed to be confirmed by a torchlight demonstration 
for Kitt's release on the night of the 7th September. (^ 3) 
The chairman at the public meeting following the pro-
cession that night was Alderman Galloway (mer-
chant), member of the CouncU of the National party, 
and honorary treasurer of the Committee for the re-
lease of the "Hopeful" prisoners. Among the eight 
speakers were: Mr. Cribb (merchant). National party 
candidate for Ipswich and chairman of the public meet-
ing of the 4th August to petition for release of the 
"Hopeful" prisoners; H. Burton, honorary secretary of 
the "Hopeful" committee; W. Widdop (merchant), and 
Joshua BaUey (merchant), prominent members of that 
Committee. "It were wilful stupidity," the "Tele-
graph" said the next day "to affect not to see what 
much of the Kitt agitation means." 
Griffith had evidently come to a similar conclusion. 
He could not support the Governor on the question of 
the release of Kitt, but said in the House that he could 
see no reason whatever for the resignation of the 
Government. At the same time he advised Musgrave 
in a memorandum that ministers' recommendations for 
release or remission of sentence should always be taken 
unless 
" 1 . Imperial interests or policy are involved; or 
2. The offence is one against the laws of the Em-
pire, which may chance to have been tried in a 
local court; or 
3. He is of opinion that the proposed action is an 
abuse of the prerogative which he ought not to 
al low." (54) 
(521 5/9/88, Leader. See also 7/9/88, 10/9/88. In his desp., Conf., 4/9/88, Mus-
grave wrote: "The article which I enclose extracted from a Maryborough paper 
is only one amongst others bul which alludes a little more distinctly than some 
lo the obvious connection between the case of Benjamin Kitt and that of the 
'Hopeful' prisoners." There is no copy of the enclosure and no marginal refer-
ence. Probably the cutting was from the "Wide Bay & Burnett News." Files 
for this period are not available in the Brisbane Libraries or in the Mitchell 
Library, Sydney. 
(53) For account see "Evening Observer," 7/9/88. 
(54) Printed "Q.P. Debates." Vol. LV; p. 207. 
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The second proviso introduces a principle so bizarre 
and ingenious that it seems to have been deliberately 
framed as a loophole with a specific case in mind. The 
future Chief Justice of Australia was not unacquainted 
with constitutional law and one must suspect that he 
discovered this "principle" with an eye on the "Hope-
ful" prisoners who were, in fact, tried under "Imperial" 
law in local courts. <5s) 
Evidently many people saw a direct connection be-
tween the two cases. Certainly, an influential wing of 
the National party was chiefly interested in Kitt's re-
lease as a necessary means to the release of the others. 
It appears, however, that cabinet later preferred to 
postpone the recommendation for release of the "Hope-
ful" prisoners. Despite the fact that a petition bear-
ing nearly thirty thousand signatures was presented 
on the 15th October, cabinet, for another fifteen 
months, resisted the pressure of its own party in the 
House to release the men or table the papers. Possibly 
the ministry wished to let the Kitt case subside before 
making the recommendation. Whatever the reason, 
there can be little doubt that cabinet was anxious to 
release the men, and the recommendation was finally 
made, and accepted by Musgrave's successor, in Feb-
ruary 1890. The reopening of the Kanaka trade two 
years later is, of course, another, though not perhaps 
a disconnected, story. 
The evidence on the question of cabinet's motives 
is far from complete and, while it suggests that Mus-
grave's explanation was right, does not prove it. Cer-
tain conclusions, however, appear to be established: 
Cabinet did not force the release of Kitt mainly because 
they thought Kitt's sentence was unjust, nor did they 
wish to alter the existing constitution. The most pro-
minent supporters of Mcllwraith's ministry in the Kitt 
case were influential in the National party and were 
leaders of the campaign to release the "Hopeful" men. 
The Liberal newspapers, and possibly Griffith, as well 
as the Governor, suspected that the ministers were 
using the Kitt case to clear the way for release of the 
"Hopeful" men. Finally, cabinet's action is fuUy con-
sistent with this view, but quite inconsistent with their 
own professed motives. 
(55) Cf. Norman to Secre tary of S l a t e , 22 /2 /90 . Conf. : "Governor' .s Conlidenlial 
Despatches lo Secretary of S t a t e , " Vol . I. Norman was duly puzzled by this 
exftic doc t r ine . 
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Looking over the whole affair it is clear that the 
Kitt case was not an attempt on the part of a united 
colony or of a nationalist party inspired by the spirit 
of independence, mounting self-confidence or patriot-
ism, to throw off one more Imperial control. The 
evidence suggests that it can only be explained as a 
struggle between Sir Anthony Musgrave and certain 
colonial interests over the Kanaka labour trade and its 
relation to New Guinea. 
